The present chapter studies conjectured variations equilibrium states (CVEs)
in a mixed oligopoly model. It is different from a classical oligopoly in that a labormanaged
firm is involved. The agents (including the labor-managed firm) when making
decisions use conjectures about how the market clearing price can vary as a result of
varying their supplies. The concept of equilibrium with the conjectures is different from
the classical Cournot-Nash one. Under fixed feasible conjectures, the existence and
uniqueness theorems for the conjectured variations equilibrium (called the exterior
equilibrium) are proven. With an aim to specify a more complicated notion of the
interior equilibrium, a consistency criterion for the conjectures (called also as influence
coefficients) is proposed. The existence of at least one consistent conjectural variations
equilibrium state (CCVE) is also established. Numerical experiments with a small test
oligipoly are also described.
Keywords: Consistent conjectural variations equilibrium, exterior equilibrium,
homogeneous good, income per worker, influence coefficients, interior
equilibrium, labor managed firm, labor input function, mixed oligopoly, Nash-
Cournot equilibrium.
