Two of the most popular theories that address the Hard Problem suggest that
the minimal unit of consciousness could emerge from subcellular structures. Both
theories neglect the importance of the subject and its agency. Both disregard the basic
phenomenological definition of consciousness: there must be someone for someone to
be conscious. According to the Integrated Information Theory (IIT), consciousness
emanates from integrated information. The axioms at the basis of the IIT speak to the
phenomenology of consciousness: consciousness exists, it is structured, it is
informative, it is irreducible and it is unique or exclusive. However, the
phenomenology of consciousness can only spring from the subject-object dialectic.
Thus, the subject must exist a priori, as a premise, not as a conclusion. Integrated
information does not provide a general cause of consciousness, but something implicit
to it. The main IIT hypothesis is hopelessly flawed. A second popular theory, the
Orchestrated Objective Reduction of quantum states postulates that a proto-element of
consciousness accompanies any quantum reduction process. It anthropomorphizes
quantum information.
Keywords: Anthropomorphic Bias, Agency and Consciousness, Consciousness in
a Photodiode, Double-Slit Experiments, Effective Information, Integrated
Information Introduction, IIT, IIT Axioms, IIT Fallacy, Minimal Unit of
Consciousness, Missing Subject, Orch OR, Orchestrated Objective Reduction
Introduction, Panpsychism, Phi-Consciousness, Proto-Consciousness, Quantum
Consciousness, Quantum Gravity, Single-Celled Organisms, Subject-Object
Dialectic.
